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RESEARCH & DEBATE

STRATEGIC CULTURE IS NOT A SILVER BULLET

Antulio J. Echevarria II

Frank Hoffman’s review essay “Strategic Culture and Ways of War: Elusive Fiction
or Essential Concept?,” which appeared in the Spring 2017 issue of the Naval War
College Review, has mischaracterized my argument regarding strategic culture
and, more generally, has misrepresented my book Reconsidering the American
Way of War. I therefore would like to clarify both—my position on American
strategic culture and the purpose of my book—for
Professor Antulio J. Echevarria II is the editor of the
this journal’s readers. Frank Hoffman and I have
U.S. Army War College quarterly, Parameters. He
holds a doctorate in modern history from Prince agreed on many issues over the years, and I apton University, and is the author of five books—
preciate the time he put into generating a detailed
After Clausewitz: German Military Thinkers before
review essay; yet we clearly have our differences.
the Great War (University Press of Kansas, 2001),
On the question of strategic culture, I certainly
Clausewitz and Contemporary War (Oxford University Press, 2007), Imagining Future War: The West’s
do believe that culture is important and that we
Technological Revolution and Visions of Wars to
should try to understand it—ours and others’. But
Come, 1880–1914 (Praeger, 2007), Reconsidering
the American Way of War (Georgetown University
there are huge risks in doing so, and buyers need
Press, 2014), and Military Strategy: A Very Short
to be aware of them before they buy. Since Jack
Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2017)—as
well as numerous articles and monographs on stra- Snyder introduced the concept in 1977, the study
tegic thinking, military theory, and military history. of strategic culture has grown into an almostHe is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, the
desperate search for a silver bullet, a cure-all: if
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and
we could just fix American strategic culture, we
the U.S. Army War College. He also has completed
a NATO Fulbright Fellowship, and was a visiting could cure U.S. strategic thinking. But the concept
research fellow at Oxford University in 2011–12.
has taken on a life of its own—and not a good
Echevarria also held the Elihu Root Chair of Military
Studies at the U.S. Army War College. He currently one. The concept’s proponents have failed to exis working on a book about the nature of America’s
ercise discipline when defining it, and they have
modern wars for Cambridge University Press.
employed it too enthusiastically, without a critical
Naval War College Review, Autumn 2017, Vol. 70, No. 4
eye or a healthy dose of skepticism. Buyers need to
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know there are ample historical examples to prove almost any theory of strategic
culture—as well as its opposite.
In their enthusiasm to find a cure for U.S. strategic thinking, the concept’s
proponents merely have paid lip service to the difficulty of defining it, then have
moved swiftly on to advancing their own theories. Most of these definitions are
arbitrary, not based on rigorous inductive analysis. This problem is a critical
one for any social science, because if a concept cannot be defined inductively,
it cannot be studied scientifically. Unfortunately, the terms culture and strategic
culture have become all but ubiquitous, encompassing virtually any conceivable
variable that possibly could influence a key leader’s decision. Worse, the concept
has become highly politicized. It is now a political catchall for every policy aim or
military approach one party does not like, particularly when a war is under way,
and at the same time it serves as a means to advance each party’s own agendas.
Consequently, no generalizable conclusion nor observation can be drawn
from the many studies of strategic culture that have proliferated over the years.
In short, the field is in disarray precisely because most scholars are self-defining
strategic culture, which means there is no conceptual foundation on which to
build knowledge.
While this state of affairs is an academic’s dream, it is a policy and military
practitioner’s nightmare. Academics earn their credentials and build their reputations by developing unique or contending interpretations—by challenging the
status quo. But practitioners need more than unique theories, because they must
bear the heavy burden of responsibility: they must decide whether to put lives
and treasure at risk, and they are held accountable when things go wrong. This
is not to say that academics are irresponsible; the good ones are not. But even
the good ones never have to order people into harm’s way; that means academics
can afford to be experimental in their thinking and to advance ideas that are not
quite ready for prime time. Practitioners, on the other hand, can benefit from
the intellectual stimulus that such cutting-edge ideas afford. But when it comes
to choosing courses of action that might have to be sold to Congress and to the
public, they need concepts that have a reasonably solid foundation, especially
when the stakes are high. Sadly, that is not the case with strategic culture. My
argument in Reconsidering the American Way of War is simply that no scholar
yet has made a truly compelling case for an American strategic culture, and thus
it remains too nebulous and unreliable for the realities that policy and military
practitioners typically face.
I am all for self-critical analysis, and I have written on that topic a great deal
over the years. Critical thinking is the practitioner’s best ally. But to solve a problem we first must understand what it is. In this case, it is not clear that we do.
The problem is that the American way of war has had many more successes than
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss4/8
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failures. The differential in favor of successes is quite significant and it applies to
all kinds of wars—large, small, and in between. That needs to be explained. But
existing theories of strategic culture cannot do so. The problems inherent in the
concept obscure not only what is wrong with U.S. strategic thinking but how to
fix it.
With regard to the overall purpose of Reconsidering the American Way of
War, I endeavored to make that clear in the book’s introduction, but perhaps I
should have been more explicit. In contrast to Russell Weigley’s 1973 classic The
American Way of War, which focused mainly on our strategic theories and ideas,
my aim was to look for patterns in the way we actually practiced war. The history
of ideas has fallen out of vogue for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is
the gap that always exists between what people say they are doing or going to do
and what they actually do. I decided to close this gap, at least in part, between
Weigley’s American Way of War as a history of ideas and the many narrative
histories we already have that tell us what happened. In a sense, I played Marx to
Weigley’s Hegel in an effort to identify any consistent patterns in our approach to
doing, rather than merely thinking about, war.
Accordingly, the book’s chapters are short. It was unnecessary to describe every battle or engagement in detail; such descriptions already exist in hundreds, if
not thousands, of other works. The readers of this journal likely know where to
find them. Some of our largest and longest wars have been characterized by the
application of strategic patterns that represented no significant changes; hence,
there was no need to drag out the discussions of those conflicts. The book includes details only insofar as they affected the general pattern (or patterns) that
drove a conflict. Moreover, the chapters are designed for a staff college or war
college curriculum that likely would include other readings. I regret not including maps in the book, as they would have made the patterns more obvious to the
reader, but the publisher vetoed that idea because it would have driven the cost
of the book too high. However, the West Point military atlases serve the purpose
and are available free online.
My analysis of U.S. military practice uncovered six basic patterns of military
strategy in our wars: annihilation, attrition, exhaustion, decapitation, coercion,
and deterrence. Interestingly, instead of overwhelming kinetic force, as Hoffman
and others argue, the strategic pattern that emerges most frequently in our way
of war is decapitation—the idea of replacing a leader whom we do not like with
one we do, through kinetic or nonkinetic means or some combination of the two.
There are various concrete reasons for the recurrence of this pattern, which I discuss in the book and thus will not repeat here. But, once again, this observation
points to the gap between what we say we do strategically and what we actually
do, or attempt to do, in practice.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017
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To sum up, my argument is not that we do not have a strategic culture, or that
culture itself is not important; my point is that strategic culture is not the silver
bullet its proponents want it to be. Whatever American strategic culture is, was,
or might be, it is too elusive to pin down. Nor can we compare it to its British
or Russian counterpart to identify what is uniquely American about our way of
war versus what has been imported from elsewhere, or which aspects really are
driven by the conditions and requirements of warfare—modern industrial-age
warfare and its reliance on wholesale attrition, for instance—rather than a general
culture. To be sure, Americans do have a way of battle, as I have said elsewhere.
It is also true that the evolution of operational art over the twentieth century has
hampered the U.S. military’s ability to think strategically. But these conditions
were not always true. I am working on a book now that will offer one defensible
explanation for how and why our major failures and successes occurred. I would
be very pleased to have it reviewed in this journal.
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